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I. Introduction 
 This case concerns challenges by David Matusiewicz 
and Amy Gonzalez (together, the “defendants”) to their 
convictions for conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and 
cyberstalking, interstate stalking resulting in death, and cyber 
stalking resulting in death, and to their resulting life sentences 
for conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and cyberstalking 
which resulted in the death of Christine Belford, the ex-wife of 
David Matusiewicz.  The defendants are siblings and were 
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indicted, along with their mother, Lenore Matusiewicz, after 
their father, Thomas Matusiewicz, shot and killed Belford and 
himself in the lobby of the New Castle County Courthouse.  
They engaged in a years-long conspiracy with Thomas 
Matusiewicz, an unindicted co-conspirator, to harass Belford, 
which ultimately resulted in her death.  On appeal, each 
defendant challenges, inter alia, the constitutionality of the 
statutes under which they were convicted, the jury’s verdict on 
sufficiency of the evidence grounds, various evidentiary 
rulings of the District Court, as well as numerous challenges to 
their sentences of life imprisonment.  Faced with numerous 
issues of first impression in this complicated case, District 
Judge Gerald McHugh, sitting by designation, handled this 
case with exceptional precision and care.  We will affirm the 
District Court in all respects. 
 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
 
David Matusiewicz1 and Christine Belford were 
married from 2001 to 2006, during which time they had three 
children, L.M.1, L.M.2, and K.M.1 (the “children”).  The 
couple and their children also lived with Belford’s one child 
from a previous marriage, K.M.2.2  After their divorce, Belford 
and David engaged in a bitter custody dispute, during which 
David accused Belford of being an unfit mother and suffering 
from mental health disorders.  On February 13, 2007, 
following an evaluation by a psychologist who determined that 
                                              
1 Hereinafter, we will refer to David Matusiewicz, 
Lenore Matusiewicz, and Thomas Matusiewicz, respectively, 
as David, Lenore, and Thomas.  
2 To protect their privacy, we will use only initials to 
refer to the children.  
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David’s allegations were unfounded, the Delaware Family 
Court awarded joint custody of the children.   
 
On August 26, 2007, rather than let the children return 
from staying with David to live with Belford, David, along 
with his mother Lenore, kidnapped L.M.1, L.M.2, and K.M.1 
and absconded to Central America.  During the kidnapping, 
David told L.M.1 that Belford had committed suicide.  In 
March 2009, the children were located in Nicaragua and 
rescued, and David and Lenore were arrested.  The children 
returned to live with Belford, who had been awarded sole 
custody during the kidnapping.  David pleaded guilty to federal 
kidnapping charges and was sentenced to 48 months of 
imprisonment on December 10, 2009.  Appendix (“App.”) 137.   
 
Later that month, while incarcerated, David sent a letter 
to his sister, Amy Gonzalez, in which he stated, “I’m done 
playing Mr. Nice Guy,” and urged her to “begin making 
complaints anonymously and repeatedly to [Delaware Youth 
and Family Services].”  App. 3389-90, 7222.  He also 
instructed her to “make sure Melinda’s website is up and has a 
true story on it and is well publicized.”  App. 3390, 7222.  
Beginning in December 2009, a webpage was published that 
identified Belford and her children by name and set forth 
detailed claims against Belford of sexual abuse, physical 
abuse, and neglect of the children.  That website was registered 
to Melinda Kula, the sister-in-law of Thomas and Lenore.  It 
stated that the “[a]ctual names were used by the request and 
with the permission of David Matusiewicz.”  App. 7882.   
 
In March and April 2011, Gonzalez published three 
YouTube videos, which included secret recordings of Belford 
and the children taken by a private investigator; posts claiming 
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Belford sexually abused her daughter, L.M.1; and images of 
polygraph test results of Lenore and Gonzalez, which 
described the accusations of sexual abuse.  From May 2011 
through September 2012, David and Gonzalez had contact with 
David’s former girlfriend, Cindy Bender, and enlisted her to 
probe Belford for details about her life and to share what she 
learned, which included information from Belford’s private 
Facebook account.   
 
Acting on instructions received from David while he 
was in prison, Lenore and Gonzalez mailed letters that accused 
Belford of sexual abuse to numerous media outlets, to the 
children’s school and teachers, and to Belford’s family 
members, neighbors, employer, church, and other members of 
her community.  The defendants also mailed letters and cards 
directly to Belford and her children.  Gonzalez and Thomas 
solicited their friends to drive past Belford’s home and report 
on what they observed.  The defendants also convinced a real 
estate agent in Delaware to conduct surveillance of Belford’s 
house and to provide them with information about Belford’s 
residence and about various persons who were part of 
Belford’s life and who were coming and going from her home.  
 
Between November 2010 and July 2011, the Delaware 
Family Court conducted a hearing over seven separate days on 
Belford’s petition for termination of David’s parental rights as 
to the children.  On August 18, 2011, the Delaware Family 
Court entered an order terminating David’s parental rights as 
well as Thomas’s, Lenore’s, and Gonzalez’s familial rights 
(the “TPR Order”).  App. 7827-68, 4310.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision.  App. 2154-55.  In spite 
of the TPR Order, the defendants continued to send letters to 
Belford’s home and made extrajudicial contact with the 
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lawyers, judges, and witnesses involved in the TPR matter.  
Thomas and Lenore made numerous phone calls to the 
chambers of the judge overseeing a separate civil matter 
between Belford and the Matusiewicz family, during which 
they told the judge’s assistant, referring to Belford, that the 
“bitch is going to get what is coming to her.”  App. 3057.  
 
On December 1, 2011, Thomas and Lenore travelled to 
Delaware and showed up uninvited at Belford’s house.  
Although Belford was not at home, the children and Belford’s 
boyfriend were.  Belford’s boyfriend instructed Thomas to 
leave.  This trip was ostensibly to visit the children, despite the 
fact that Delaware Family Court had previously denied 
petitions by both Thomas and Gonzalez to visit the children.  
The night before the trip, Thomas and Gonzalez exchanged 
emails in which Thomas informed Gonzalez of the visit, 
instructed her to clean out his home safe, and told her that he 
would let her know how things worked out.  App. 3319-21, 
8886.  In response, Gonzalez gave Thomas her temporary cell 
phone number and told him to be careful.  App. 8886.  In the 
emails, Thomas and David refer to Belford by a 
nickname,“wb,” which stood for “Whore Bitch.”  App. 3243-
44.  Thomas sent a letter to David after his visit that contained 
the details of what he had observed.  App. 7226-28.  After this 
visit, Belford took steps to sell her home and move.  The 
defendants then obtained the real estate listing — before it was 
made publicly available — from the real estate agent whom 
they had enlisted to surveil Belford.   
 
On November 1, 2012, David sent Gonzalez an email 
saying, “[p]repare yourself to be managing four by this time in 
2013.”  App. 3460-61.  Gonzalez responded to the email by 
stating that she was “praying for it.”  App. 3462.  The 
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Government’s case agent later testified that the reference to 
“four” equated to David’s three children plus Gonzalez’s one 
child.  App. 3461.   
 
On November 5, 2012, David filed a petition to reduce 
his back payments of child support in Delaware Family Court.  
A hearing was scheduled in Delaware, and although David was 
informed he could participate by phone as he resided with his 
family in Texas at the time, he chose to attend in person.  David 
received permission from his probation officers to attend, but 
he failed to disclose to them that he could participate by phone 
or that his parents would be accompanying him.  On February 
4, 2013, David, Lenore, and Thomas drove to Delaware in two 
vehicles, which were loaded with an assault rifle, handguns, 
military-style knives, thousands of rounds of ammunition, 
restraints, body armor, binoculars, an electric shock device, gas 
cans, a shovel, photographs of Belford’s children and 
residence, and handwritten notes about Belford’s neighbors.  
Thomas left a note for Gonzalez in a hutch in the family’s 
residence, instructing her to keep his guns for protection and 
that stated “hopefully we can end this BS now – up to Dave.”  
App. 3318, 7461.   
 
On February 11, 2013, Thomas and David entered the 
New Castle County Courthouse lobby, in Delaware, and 
remained there for approximately 25 to 30 minutes, during 
which time David and Thomas exchanged envelopes, before 
David passed through the security checkpoint.  Belford entered 
the courthouse with her friend Laura “Beth” Mulford a short 
time later.  Thomas then shot and killed both women, injured 
two police officers in an exchange of fire, and then shot himself 
in the head.  Investigators recovered from Thomas’s person 
two death certificates that were filled out with the names of 
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Belford and her family court attorney.  Investigators also found 
papers containing Thomas’s burial request during a search of 
David’s person following his arrest. 
 
On February 13, 2013 — two days later — Gonzalez 
submitted a petition for custody of the children to the Delaware 
Family Court in the New Castle County Courthouse, with a 
check dated February 12, 2013.  App. 4306-07.  The petition 
was denied.  In the ensuing six months, Gonzalez continued to 
file additional custody petitions.  App. 4307-12, 7974-8009.  
Gonzales also made repeated attempts to contact the children 
through the mail.  App. 4312-13, 8542-45.   
 
On August 6, 2013, David Matusiewicz, Lenore 
Matusiewicz, and Amy Gonzalez were indicted on the 
following counts:  (1) conspiracy to commit interstate stalking 
and cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1) and 
(2), all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) interstate stalking 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1), 2261(b) and 2; 
(3) interstate stalking resulting in the death of Belford, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1), 2261(b) and 2; and (4) cyberstalking 
resulting in the death of Belford, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2261A(2), 2261(b) and 2.  Counts One and Four were 
against all defendants.  Count Two was only against Lenore.  
Count Three was against David and Lenore.  Thomas was 
listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment.  All 
three defendants pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to 
trial. 
 
We set forth a brief summary of the evidence introduced 
by the Government at trial relevant to the issues on appeal.  
This includes evidence that after the shooting, law enforcement 
officers found firearms and ammunition in the vehicles that the 
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Matusiewicz family had driven from Texas.  The key to this 
vehicle was found on David’s person.  The Government also 
introduced evidence of a surveillance video from a Walmart 
parking lot in Maryland that depicted Thomas, David, and 
Lenore walking around the vehicle with its trunk open, 
demonstrating that all three knew of the weapons and 
ammunition. 
 
Law enforcement recovered a red notebook entitled 
“Important Information for David Matusiewicz” from the 
vehicle that David and Thomas drove to the courthouse; the 
contents of this notebook were in Thomas’s handwriting.  App. 
3224-35.  Within were the real estate listing for and pictures of 
Belford’s home, accompanied by handwritten notes 
identifying the bedrooms in which Belford and her children 
slept.  It also contained personal, identifying information on 
Belford’s family, lawyers, doctors, boyfriend, and employer, 
as well as a daily surveillance log tracking Belford’s 
movements over a twelve-day period in March 2010.  
Additionally, there was a page marked “HL,” which the 
Government argued stood for “hit list,” that identified sixteen 
individuals, including the judges, lawyers, and witnesses 
involved in the prior federal kidnapping and family court cases.  
App. 3249-53, 5442, 6995. 
 
The Government introduced evidence recovered from a 
search of Gonzalez’s residence.  This included large volumes 
of correspondence with third parties about the stalking 
campaign.  It also introduced letters from Thomas to Gonzalez 
that they “must drink to WB’s, [a nickname for Belford,] final 
day,” that Belford “can not keep” the children “at all costs,” 
and that Belford “can not [and] will not have our girls into her 
old age.  Ain’t gonna happen.”  App. 3442-43.  
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At trial, a key part of the Government’s case was that 
the defendants’ accusations that Belford sexually molested her 
children and suffered from mental health disorders were false 
and defamatory.  The spreading of these false claims was an 
important part of the defendants’ campaign to harass and 
intimidate Belford.  The Government provided ample evidence 
demonstrating the falsity of these claims.  Notably, L.M.1 
testified that her mother did not abuse her, and refuted the 
specific claimed incidents of abuse advanced by the 
defendants.  L.M.1 also testified that she was afraid when she 
learned of the allegations and saw her name and personal 
information online.  The Government also provided the 
testimony of L.M.1’s pediatrician and psychologist who 
corroborated that L.M.1 never reported nor showed any signs 
of abuse. 
 
The Government also discredited the defendants’ 
accusations of abuse by pointing out that the timeline of their 
claims of abuse did not add up.  No accusations of sexual abuse 
were made prior to the kidnapping in August 2007.  Evidence 
was introduced that at his TPR hearing, David testified that he 
kidnapped the children upon learning about the abuse in either 
July or August 2007.  However, evidence also showed that 
David began preparing for the kidnapping as early as fall 2006.  
The Government introduced evidence that defendants gave 
contradictory and shifting statements about when and how they 
learned of the abuse, and about the details of the incidents of 
abuse.  The Director of the Delaware Division of Family 
Services (“DDFS”), the state organization responsible for 
investigation of child abuse, also testified, explaining that 
DDFS did not open an investigation into the abuse because it 
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found that the defendants’ contradictory claims lacked 
credibility.     
 
Belford’s eldest child, K.M.2, testified that she, her 
mother, and her siblings were aware of the defendants’ conduct 
and it caused them to fear for their lives.  L.M.1 also testified 
about her fear, and the pain of losing her mother.  The 
Government also produced evidence from numerous third 
parties to whom Belford had confided her own fears of the 
defendants, resulting from their conduct.  For example, 
Belford’s therapist testified as to the emotional and 
psychological toll that the defendants’ actions were having on 
Belford.  
 
After a five week trial, the jury convicted the defendants 
on all counts.  On February 18, 2016, the District Court held a 
sentencing hearing.  The District Court applied a number of 
sentencing enhancements, including:  (1) the first-degree 
murder cross-reference pursuant to United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2A1.1; (2) the vulnerable victim 
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1); and (3) the 
official victim enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 3A1.2(c)(1).  App. 6057-6126.  The District Court sentenced 
each of the defendants to a term of five years of imprisonment 
on Count One, and a term of life imprisonment for Count Four.  
App. 2-8, 10-15.3  This timely appeal followed. 
 
                                              
3 Lenore died before the conclusion of her appeal, so her 
sentence was abated.   
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III. Analysis4 
 
The defendants raise numerous challenges to their 
convictions and sentences.  David brings challenges to:  (1) the 
sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the lack of a specific unanimity 
instruction; (3) the District Court’s “death resulted” 
instruction; (4) the District Court’s alleged judicial factfinding 
in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
in imposing the sentence; (5) the application of the vulnerable 
victim and official victim sentencing enhancements; (6) the 
admission of the TPR Order into evidence; (7) the admission 
of Belford’s past therapy sessions and emails into evidence; 
and (8) the testimony of the FBI case agent vouching for the 
weight of the case.  In addition to joining these challenges, 
Gonzalez also raises the following additional issues: (9) that 
the anti-cyberstalking statute violates the First Amendment and 
is void for vagueness; (10) that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to sit in the District of Delaware because venue was 
transferred out of Delaware; (11) that her polygraph evidence 
offered in rebuttal was erroneously excluded; (12) that the 
District Court erred in ruling that Government would be 
permitted to cross-examine any character witnesses about her 
prior conduct in relation to the kidnapping; and (13) that her 
sentence of life imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment.  
We will address each of these issues in turn. 
 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenge 
 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over the underlying 
criminal proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over these direct appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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“We apply a ‘particularly deferential’ standard of 
review to a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting 
a jury verdict.”  United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 125 
(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 
175 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Under this standard, we will affirm the 
verdict if “‘any rational juror’ could have found the challenged 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in 
the manner that is most favorable to the government, neither 
reweighing evidence, nor making an independent 
determination as to witnesses’ credibility.”  Id. (quoting 
Cothran, 286 F.3d at 175).   
 
Count One charged the defendants with conspiring to 
commit interstate stalking and cyberstalking, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  To establish a conspiracy under this section, the 
Government must prove:  (1) an agreement between two or 
more persons to commit the substantive offense; (2) that each 
defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy; and (3) an overt 
act committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544 
(3d Cir. 2002).  This requires proof that a defendant has 
“knowledge of the conspiracy’s specific objective.”  United 
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.2d 418, 431 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc).  We have held that “a conspiratorial 
agreement can be proven circumstantially based upon 
reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements of the 
conspirators or from the circumstances surrounding the 
scheme.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
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Count Three charged only David and Lenore with 
interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1).5  To 
prove interstate stalking, the Government was required to 
prove that David:   
 
[(1)] travel[ed] in interstate or foreign commerce 
. . .  [(2)] with the intent to kill, injure, harass, 
intimidate, or place under surveillance with 
intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another 
person, and [(3)] in the course of, or as a result 
of, such travel . . . engage[d] in conduct that--  
(A) place[d] that person in reasonable fear 
of the death of, or serious bodily injury 
to—  
(i) that person;  
(ii) an immediate family member . 
. . of that person; or  
(iii) a spouse or intimate partner of 
that person; or  
(B) cause[d], attempt[ed] to cause, or 
would be reasonably expected to cause 
substantial emotional distress [to that 
person or their spouse, intimate partner, 
or immediate family member].   
 
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1).   
 
Count Four, brought against all of the defendants, charged 
cyberstalking resulting in the death of Belford, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2), 2261(b), and 2.  We have held that to prove 
                                              
5 Because Count Two was brought only against Lenore, 
it is not at issue in this appeal. 
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stalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), the Government must 
establish that (1) the defendants used a facility of interstate 
commerce; (2) to engage in a course of conduct that places a 
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, or 
causes substantial emotional distress, either to that person or to 
a partner or immediate family member; (3) “with the intent to 
kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with 
intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate that person.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2261A(2); see also United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 
132, 163 (3d Cir. 2009).  The statute defines a “course of 
conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose.”  18 U.S.C. § 2266.  A 
defendant who violates § 2261A is eligible for a sentence of 
life imprisonment if the “death of the victim results.”  Id. 
§ 2261(b)(1). 
 
 The defendants each argue that the evidence presented 
to the jury was insufficient to convict them of any of the counts 
in the indictment.  Their sufficiency challenges revolve around 
the same argument that was presented to and rejected by the 
jury:  that Thomas acted alone in killing Belford and the 
defendants neither knew about nor participated in his plan.6  
The defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence of a 
conspiracy because there was no evidence of an express 
agreement to stalk or kill Belford.  They do not dispute the 
existence of their campaign to spread accusations that Belford 
sexually abused the children, but contend that it was not a 
stalking campaign because it was meant to spur an 
investigation of these claims, which the defendants purport to 
have sincerely believed.  However, the jury was presented with 
                                              
6 The defendants do not contest the interstate commerce 
elements of any of the counts. 
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overwhelming evidence demonstrating both that the sexual 
abuse accusations against Belford were false and that 
defendants knew that these allegations were false. 
 
 We have reviewed the substantial amount of evidence 
before the jury.  Taken in the light most favorable to the 
Government, see Peppers, 302 F.3d at 125, the evidence is 
more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict in its entirety.  
Throughout the course of the five-week trial, the Government 
produced approximately 65 witnesses and over 760 exhibits, 
which show that the defendants conspired to engage in an 
escalating campaign of harassment, intimidation, and 
surveillance against Belford, all with the goal of regaining 
custody of the children.  This three-year stalking campaign 
culminated in the murder of Belford in the New Castle County 
Courthouse lobby by Thomas, a member of the conspiracy.   
 
 Both David and Gonzalez were intimately involved in 
this stalking campaign and conspiracy.  The evidence 
demonstrating David’s involvement included:  directing his 
family to send letters to Belford’s acquaintances accusing 
Belford of sexual abuse; setting up the in-person court hearing 
that brought Belford to the courthouse where Thomas shot her; 
lying to probation officers about the need to attend the hearing 
in person; and traveling from Texas to Delaware in two vehicles 
that were filled with numerous weapons.   
 
 The evidence demonstrating Gonzalez’s involvement 
included:  spreading the false accusations of child abuse by 
creating online postings and YouTube videos, and sending 
defamatory emails and letters to Belford’s acquaintances; 
preparing false polygraph reports about these accusations; 
recruiting third parties to surveil and report on Belford and the 
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children; providing Thomas with her temporary cell phone 
number and cleaning out his safe when he traveled to Delaware 
in 2011 and showed up at Belford’s house; and filing numerous 
petitions for custody of the children beginning two days after 
Belford was killed.  Thus, we conclude that the evidence was 
more than sufficient to support the conspiracy charges against 
David and Gonzalez. 
 
As to the charged violation of § 2261A(2), the 
Government produced sufficient evidence that David and 
Gonzalez committed cyberstalking that resulted in Belford’s 
death.  Our review of the record demonstrates that the evidence 
shows that each of the defendants engaged in many more than 
the two requisite acts in furtherance of their long campaign to 
defame and accuse Belford of sexual abuse of her children.  
The purpose of this campaign, and the acts committed in 
furtherance thereof, was to regain custody of the children by 
removing Belford — or causing her to remove herself — from 
the equation.  The evidence discussed above was more than 
sufficient for the jury to determine that the accusations against 
Belford were false, and thus infer that the defendants continued 
making these accusations with the intent to harass or intimidate 
Belford.   
 
 The record also contains overwhelming evidence of the 
fear and emotional distress suffered by Belford and her 
children.  This includes testimony by Belford’s children about 
their awareness and fear of the defendants’ conduct.  The 
Government also produced evidence from numerous third 
parties to whom Belford had confided her fears of the 
defendants due to their conduct, including Belford’s 
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discussions with her therapist about the emotional and 
psychological toll that the defendants’ actions had on her.7   
 
 Finally, the Government produced sufficient evidence 
to prove that the defendants’ conduct resulted in Belford’s 
death, thus making them eligible for life sentences under 
§ 2261(b)(1).  As discussed more thoroughly below with 
regard to the jury instruction challenge, the District Court 
properly instructed the jury that the defendants could be 
responsible for Belford’s death either because their actions 
were the actual and proximate cause of her death, or by way of 
co-conspirator liability, if she was killed by a co-conspirator 
acting in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Our review of the 
record demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish either theory of liability.  
 
                                              
7 We have reviewed the record and conclude that it also 
contains sufficient evidence to support the count brought only 
against David for interstate stalking under § 2261A(1).  This 
includes the evidence that he initiated the court hearing in 
Delaware, to which he traveled from Texas, with his parents in 
two vehicles that were filled with numerous weapons.  
Together with the fact that he did not inform his probation 
officers that he could participate in the hearing by telephone to 
get permission to leave the state, this is sufficient to support an 
inference by the jury that he traveled in interstate commerce 
with “the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under 
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate” 
Belford.  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1).  The above-discussed 
evidence of emotional distress that satisfied the § 2261A(2) 
violation is also sufficient to satisfy the § 2261A(1) violation. 
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 David’s involvement in the stalking campaign, as well 
as his actions in setting up the court hearing and bringing 
Thomas to the courthouse where he then shot Belford, are 
sufficient to support an interference that he was the “but for” 
cause of Belford’s death.  And as discussed above, there is 
sufficient evidence to support the inference that he had the 
specific intent that Belford should die.  See supra, note 7.  As 
to Gonzalez, her involvement in the stalking campaign also 
demonstrates that she was a “but for” cause of Belford’s death.  
Gonzalez’s numerous communications with her family 
members indicate that it was reasonably foreseeable to her that 
Belford’s murder at her family’s hands might soon come to 
pass, and support an inference that she was the proximate cause 
of Belford’s death.  This evidence includes the correspondence 
from Thomas to Gonzales that the two drink to Belford’s “final 
day” and the communication from David that Gonzalez should 
prepare herself to soon be managing four children.  Further, 
Gonzalez was ready to — and did — petition for custody of the 
children almost immediately after Belford was killed.8 
                                              
8 Even if this evidence of the defendants’ direct 
involvement in Belford’s death were not sufficient, the jury’s 
finding that their actions resulted in Belford’s death is proper 
under co-conspirator liability.  The doctrine of co-conspirator 
liability “permits the government to prove the guilt of one 
defendant through the acts of another committed within the 
scope of and in furtherance of a conspiracy of which the 
defendant was a member, provided the acts are reasonably 
foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the 
conspiracy.”  United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Because there was sufficient evidence supporting 
the conspiracy conviction, there was also sufficient evidence 
supporting finding David and Gonzalez responsible for 
 22 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the evidence produced at trial 
was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.   
 
B. Jury Instruction Challenges 
 
 The defendants raise two challenges to the District 
Court’s jury instructions.  They contend that the District Court 
(1) erred in not providing a specific unanimity instruction, and 
(2) erred in its construction of the “death results” instruction.  
Our “[r]eview of the legal standard enunciated in a jury 
instruction is plenary, but review of the wording of the 
instruction, i.e., the expression, is for abuse of discretion.”  
United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citation omitted).  Because the defendants failed to object to 
the unanimity instructions or raise the specific unanimity 
instruction issue before the District Court, we review that issue 
for plain error.  See United States v. Poulson, 871 F.3d 261, 
270 (3d Cir. 2017).  Under plain error review, we require the 
defendants to show that there is: (1) an error; (2) that is “clear 
                                              
Belford’s death pursuant to co-conspirator liability.  Thomas, 
who shot Belford, was a co-conspirator.  As discussed above, the 
Government submitted sufficient evidence that the goal of the 
conspiracy was to obtain custody of the children by driving 
Belford out of the picture.  Killing Belford would clearly be in 
furtherance of this goal.  And the evidence before the jury, 
including the communications between Thomas and the other 
defendants, the detailed surveillance of Belford, and the amount 
of weapons brought with the Matusiewicz family to Delaware, 
in addition to the other evidence that has been discussed above, 
demonstrates that Thomas’s murder of Belford was reasonably 
foreseeable to both David and Gonzalez.  Thus, the 
requirements of co-conspirator liability are satisfied. 
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or obvious;” and (3) that “affected the appellants’ substantial 
rights.”  United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 
2013) (citations omitted).  “If those three prongs are satisfied, 
we have ‘the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which 
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”  Id.  (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 
129, 135 (2009)).  
 
1. Lack of a Specific Unanimity Instruction 
 
The defendants argue that the District Court erred 
because it failed to give a specific unanimity instruction to 
inform the jury that it must unanimously agree on which 
specific acts the defendants committed.  To prove 
cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), the Government 
must, inter alia, establish that the defendant engaged in a course 
of conduct that placed a person in reasonable fear of death or 
serious bodily injury, or causes substantial emotional distress, 
either to that person or to a partner or immediate family 
member, “with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or 
place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or 
intimidate” that person.  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2); Fullmer, 584 
F.3d at 163.  The defendants argue that the jury was required to 
be unanimous on which of the specific acts it found to be part 
of the defendants’ course of conduct.   
 
“It is well settled that a defendant in a federal criminal 
trial has a constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.”  
Yeaman, 194 F.3d at 453.  We have acknowledged that “[t]his 
includes the right to have the jury instructed that in order to 
convict, it must reach unanimous agreement on each element 
of the offense charged.”  Id.  This is known as the “general 
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unanimity instruction.”  United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 
460 (3d Cir. 1987).  Typically, when an indictment alleges a 
number of different factual bases for the defendants’ criminal 
liability, the general unanimity instruction ensures that the jury 
unanimously agrees on the factual basis for a conviction.  Id.  
However, “this does not mean one has a right to insist on an 
instruction requiring unanimous agreement on the means by 
which each element is satisfied.”  Yeaman, 194 F.3d at 453.  In 
the case where “a statute enumerates alternative routes for its 
violation, it may be less clear . . . whether these are mere means 
of committing a single offense (for which unanimity is not 
required) or whether these are independent elements of the 
crime (for which unanimity is required).”  Id.   
 
 Here, the defendants contend that specific unanimity is 
required because the statute contains multiple alternative 
routes for its violations, which consist of distinct elements.  In 
their briefing, the defendants identify two different portions of 
the statute which they argue consist of distinct elements 
requiring specific unanimity:  (1) the two specific acts that 
must be proven to establish the course of conduct requirement, 
and (2) the mens rea requirement. The Government contends 
that these are no more than distinct means of committing 
cyberstalking, not elements.  The defendants argue in the 
alternative that the uncertainty over whether these are elements 
or means creates the potential for jury confusion, which would 
also necessitate a more specific unanimity instruction.  See 
Beros, 833 F.2d at 460 (observing that the general unanimity 
instruction can be insufficient “where the complexity of the 
case, or other factors, creates the potential that the jury will be 
confused”).  The defendants thus contend that under Beros, the 
District Court was required to provide a more specific 
unanimity instruction.  We disagree. 
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 In Beros, we described a scenario in which the general 
unanimity instruction is not sufficient, concluding that 
 
When it appears . . . that there is a genuine 
possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction 
may occur as the result of different jurors 
concluding that the defendant committed 
different acts, the general unanimity instruction 
does not suffice.  To correct any potential 
confusion in such a case, the trial judge must 
augment the general instruction to ensure the 
jury understands its duty to unanimously agree to 
a particular set of facts. 
 
Id. at 461 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Echeverry, 698 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.), modified, 719 
F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc)). 
 
 The indictment at issue in Beros advanced multiple 
different theories for how the defendant had violated the 
relevant statute.  Id. at 460.  There, the Government charged 
the defendant under a disjunctively worded statute, alleging 
that the defendant violated that statute by engaging in three 
separate and different acts.  Id.  We held that the district court 
abused its discretion in not specifically instructing the jury that it 
had to be unanimous as to at least one of the three acts 
committed.  Id. at 460-63.  We determined that “[w]hen the 
government chooses to prosecute under an indictment 
advancing multiple theories, it must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one of the theories to the satisfaction of the entire 
jury.”  Id. at 462.  We went on to specify that the Government 
“cannot rely on a composite theory of guilt, producing twelve 
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jurors who unanimously thought the defendant was guilty but 
who were not unanimous in their assessment of which act 
supported the verdict.”  Id.   
 
 Since Beros, we have reiterated that “the need for a 
specific unanimity instruction is the exception to the ‘routine 
case’ in which a ‘general unanimity instruction will ensure that 
the jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a conviction, even 
where an indictment alleges numerous factual bases for 
criminal liability.’”  United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 
312 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Beros, 833 F.2d at 460).  And, we 
have held that “[t]he Beros rule comes into play only when the 
circumstances are such that the jury is likely to be confused as 
to whether it is required to be unanimous on an essential 
element.”  Id.  Thus, Beros applies where the Government 
advances different factual theories concerning the defendants’ 
charged conduct, each of which could independently satisfy the 
elements of the crime.  In such a situation, a specific unanimity 
instruction is needed to ensure that the jury agrees on which of 
a (or a set of) charged act(s) that the defendant committed 
constituted criminal behavior.  For example, in Beros, the 
indictment alleged that defendant embezzled money from a 
pension fund of which he was a trustee.  Beros, 833 F.2d at 
458.  One count of the indictment  
 
alleged three separate transactions of [his] 
criminal conduct:  (1) the use of a Joint Council 
credit card to pay air fare for himself and his 
wife; (2) occupying a hotel suite that cost 
$160.00 per day rather than a single or double 
room which would cost no more than $60.00 per 
day; and (3) remaining in Florida for a couple of 
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additional days for personal reasons after the 
conclusion of the conference. 
 
Id. at 461. 
 
We held that a specific unanimity instruction was 
needed to ensure that the jury did not return a guilty verdict 
where all jurors agreed that the defendant engaged in criminal 
conduct, but some jurors thought that only the first transaction 
constituted criminal conduct, and others thought that only the 
second or third transactions constituted criminal conduct.  Id.  
We reasoned that in such a scenario, “the jury would 
unanimously conclude that there was a mode or manner of 
violating the law, but there would be no unanimity as to the 
predicate act.  Also, under such a scenario, any verdict would 
be defective because of the lack of real unanimity.”  Id. at 462.  
In contrast, we have held that a specific unanimity instruction 
is not needed, because the same potential for juror confusion 
does not exist, where “the government did not allege different 
sets of facts, and the only possible confusion arose from the 
disjunctive nature of the charge under the statute.”  Cusumano, 
943 F.2d at 312.  Applying Beros, we have since observed that 
“[w]e have never required that jurors be in complete agreement 
as to the collateral or underlying facts which relate to the 
manner in which the culpable conduct was undertaken.”  
United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 We hold that the District Court was not required to issue 
a specific unanimity instruction in this case.  Neither the mens 
rea requirements of § 2261A(2) nor the individual acts which 
constituted the statute’s “course of conduct” requirement 
constitute distinct elements of the offense.  As to the mens rea 
requirement, we have held that different mental states in a 
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statute constitute alternate means and not alternate elements.  
See United States v. Navarro, 145 F.3d 580, 586 (3d Cir. 1998).  
In Navarro, we determined that “it is neither clear nor obvious 
that the three alternative mental states defined in § 1956[, the 
anti-money-laundering statute,] could not properly be treated 
as separate means of committing a single offense.”  Id. at 592.  
This conclusion followed from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), which held that a 
specific unanimity instruction was not needed for a prosecution 
under “an Arizona statute which defined first-degree murder as 
being either (a) willful, deliberate, or premeditated, or (b) 
committed in the course of certain felonies,” because those two 
alternatives were not separate elements but instead “alternative 
means of satisfying an element of an offense.”  Navarro, 145 
F.3d at 586 (citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 628). 
 
 Here, the statute requires that the defendant act “with 
the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under 
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).  Nothing in the text of the statute or any 
cases interpreting it indicates that it was intended to create 
separate offenses for stalking “with the intent to kill” as 
opposed to stalking “with the intent to . . . injure” or “with the 
intent to . . . harass.”  Instead, the statute requires that the 
defendant engage in “a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or 
more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose” that “places that 
person in reasonable fear of the death of or serious bodily 
injury” or causes that person “substantial emotional distress.”  
Id. §§ 2261A(2), 2266.  A defendant violates the statute if that 
conduct is engaged in with one of the aforementioned mentes 
reae.  We have noted that “different means for committing an 
offense ‘must reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or 
culpability.’”  Yeaman, 194 F.3d at 454 n.6 (quoting United 
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States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 820 (3d Cir. 1996)).  The 
offense here stresses the effect that the defendant’s conduct has 
on the victim.  Thus, as long as that conduct was taken with an 
intent to cause the victim harm, the specific mental state does 
not make a difference to the defendant’s culpability.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that the statute sets forth different tiers of 
punishment based not on the mental state of the defendant, but 
on the harm suffered by the victim.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b). 
 
 The decisions of our sister Courts of Appeals 
interpreting § 2261A(2) support our view that the mens rea 
requirement constitutes alternate means as opposed to alternate 
elements of the offense.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, for instance, has declined to parse the different mentes 
reae, and observed that “[i]t is an element of the crime that [the 
defendant] have intended harm to a particular victim.”  United 
States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 311 (4th Cir. 2012).  The Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also treated the mens rea 
requirement as a single element in conducting its analysis of 
the statute.  See United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 947 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 
 A specific unanimity instruction was also not needed as 
to the course of conduct requirement.  The jury is not required 
to agree on which specific acts were part of the stalking 
campaign.  The statute defines the required “course of 
conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose.”  18 U.S.C. § 2266(2).  The 
defendants argue that because, to be convicted of 
cyberstalking, they must have committed two or more acts as 
part of the course of conduct, the jury needs to agree on the 
specifics of which acts were committed with the requisite 
criminal intent.   
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However, the two or more specific acts that constitute a 
course of conduct are not distinct elements of the offense.  The 
crux of the course of conduct requirement is that the defendants 
have engaged in “a pattern of conduct,” which “evidenc[es] a 
continuity of purpose.”  Id. § 2266(2).  This language is 
significant.  The focus is not on the individual acts as separate, 
distinct events, but instead on the purpose and scope of the 
defendants’ pattern of stalking conduct as a whole.  See United 
States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
statute’s intent requirement ‘modifies the cumulative course of 
conduct as a whole,’” and avoids criminalizing otherwise 
innocent acts) (quoting Shrader, 675 F.3d at 311-12)).  Nothing 
in the statute requires that the individual acts be criminal 
violations on their own.  The statute does not require that a 
defendant commit multiple criminal acts to engage in a course 
of conduct.  Instead, it is the pattern of conduct formed by the 
individual acts, undertaken with a continuity of purpose, that 
constitutes the criminal violation.  As the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit observed,  
 
While the statute does not impose a requirement 
that the government prove that each act was 
intended in isolation to cause serious distress or 
fear of bodily injury to the victim, the 
government is required to show that the totality 
of the defendant’s conduct “evidenc[ed] a 
continuity of purpose” to achieve the criminal 
end. 
 
Shrader, 675 F.3d at 311.  The court then concluded that “[t]his 
statutory scheme reflects a clear understanding on the part of 
Congress that while severe emotional distress can of course be 
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the result of discrete traumatic acts, the persistent efforts of a 
disturbed harasser over a period of time . . . can be equally or 
even more injurious.”  Id. at 311-12.  As a result, “[t]he 
cumulative effect of a course of stalking conduct may be 
greater than the sum of its individual parts.”  Id. at 312.  The 
court thus rejected the intent and unanimity position that the 
defendants take here, because it held “[t]o read in a 
requirement that each act have its own specific intent element 
would undo the law’s protection for victims whose anguish is 
the result of persistent or repetitive conduct on the part of a 
harasser.”  Id. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s failure to 
include a specific unanimity instructions was not an error, and 
the defendants are not entitled to relief under plain error 
review. 
 
2. “Death Results” Instruction 
 
 The defendants next argue that the District Court erred 
in its construction of the special instruction it gave the jury to 
determine whether the defendants qualified for the “death of 
the victim results” sentencing enhancement.  18 U.S.C. § 
2261(b)(1).  The proper construction of this instruction was an 
issue of first impression for the District Court and remains one 
for us.  The defendants concede that this instruction should be 
reviewed for plain error.  Matusiewicz Br. 66, 75. 
 
The District Court gave the following “death results” 
instruction as part of its “Special Interrogatory Regarding the 
Death of Christine Belford — Counts Three and Four” jury 
instruction: 
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A person’s death “results” from an 
offense only if that offense caused, or brought 
about, that death.  In determining whether the 
particular offenses charged in Counts 3 or 4 
caused Christine Belford’s death, you must 
affirmatively answer two questions.  First, would 
Christine Belford’s death have occurred as 
alleged in the Indictment in the absence of the 
particular offense?  Stated differently, you 
should decide whether Ms. Belford would have 
died at the New Castle County Courthouse on 
February 11, 2013, but for the particular offense.  
Second, was Christine Belford’s death the result 
of the particular offense in a real and meaningful 
way?  This includes your consideration of 
whether her death was a reasonably foreseeable 
result of the particular offense and whether her 
death could be expected to follow as a natural 
consequence of the particular offense. 
 
With regard to the special interrogatories 
for Counts Three and Four, if you found the 
Defendant guilty of conspiracy under Count One 
it is not necessary for you to find that a particular 
defendant’s personal actions resulted in the death 
of Christine Belford.  A defendant may be held 
accountable for the death of Christine Belford 
based on the legal rule that each member of a 
specific conspiracy is responsible for acts 
committed by the other members, as long as 
those acts were committed to help further or 
achieve the objective of the specific conspiracy 
and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant 
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as a necessary or natural consequence of the 
agreement.  In other words, under certain 
circumstances the act of one conspirator may be 
treated as the act of all.  This means that all the 
conspirators may be held accountable for acts 
committed by any one or more of them, even 
though they did not all personally participate in 
that act themselves. 
 
In order for you to answer “yes” to the 
jury interrogatories for Counts Three or Four 
based upon this legal rule, you must find that the 
Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
each of the following four (4) requirements with 
regard to the charge at issue: 
 
First: That the defendant was a member 
of the conspiracy to commit the 
particular offense charged in 
Count One of the Indictment; 
 
Second: That while the defendant was still 
a member of the conspiracy, one or 
more of the other members of the 
same conspiracy also committed 
the offense charged in Count Three 
or Count Four, by committing each 
of the elements of that offense as I 
explained those elements to you in 
these instructions, and his or her 
acts therein resulted in the death of 
Christine Belford according to the 
instructions I have just given you.  
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However, the other member of the 
conspiracy need not have been 
found guilty of (or even charged 
with) the offense in question, as 
long as you find that the 
Government proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the other 
member committed the offense. 
 
Third: That the other member of the 
conspiracy committed this 
particular offense within the scope 
of the unlawful agreement and to 
help further or achieve the 
objectives of the specific 
conspiracy; and 
 
Fourth: That Ms. Belford’s death was 
reasonably foreseeable to or 
reasonably anticipated by the 
defendant as a necessary or natural 
consequence of the unlawful 
agreement. 
 
 The Government does not have to prove 
that the defendant specifically agreed or knew 
that Ms. Belford’s death would result.  However, 
the Government must prove that Ms. Belford’s 
death was reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant, as a member of the conspiracy, and 
within the scope of the agreement as the 
defendant understood it. 
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App. 5871-72. 
 
 The defendants contend that the District Court erred by 
giving this instruction.  They contend that the instruction 
should have required that the jury find that there was an 
agreement among the defendants to cause Belford’s death.9  
They also contend that under the instructions the District Court 
gave, the jury could not have found that the defendants caused 
Belford’s death.  The Government argues that this instruction 
properly set forth the two possible ways that the jury could find 
that the defendants’ actions resulted in Belford’s death.  These 
theories of liability are that:  (1) Belford’s death resulted from 
the defendants’ personal actions if the defendants’ personal 
actions were the actual and proximate cause of Belford’s death, 
or (2) the defendants are responsible for Belford’s death under 
co-conspirator liability. 
 
 The District Court included both theories in its jury 
instruction and clearly distinguished between them.  With 
respect to the first theory, that the defendants’ personal actions 
were the actual and proximate cause of Belford’s death, the 
District Court observed that its instruction held the jury to a 
higher standard than it believed the law required.  See App. 61.  
Under this theory, the instruction required that the jurors find 
that each defendant’s conduct was the actual cause of Belford’s 
death and, in the context of the proximate cause question, that 
the death was “the result of the particular offense in a real and 
meaningful way,” including whether it was “reasonably 
                                              
9 While the defendants contend that the District Court’s 
instruction was erroneous, they do not articulate clearly a 
proposed alternative instruction.  Instead, much of their 
argument retreads their sufficiency of the evidence challenge.  
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foreseeable” and “could be expected to follow as a natural 
consequence of the particular offense.”  App. 5871.  The 
District Court observed that it included this language “to 
increase the government’s burden by highlighting for the jury 
the need for there to exist a genuine nexus between the 
Defendants’ conduct and the victim’s death.”  App. 61.  It 
explained that it required this heightened burden as to 
proximate cause, beyond what would be typically required for 
a proximate cause finding in tort law, as a “necessary 
safeguard” for the defendants’ rights.  App. 61.  
 
Because the issue of how to define for the jury the proof 
required to establish that the defendants’ conduct caused the 
victim’s death, thus triggering the “death results” enhancement 
under § 2261(b)(1), is one of first impression, the District 
Court issued a supplemental opinion explaining its reasoning 
for fashioning the jury instruction the way it did.  See App. 56-
61.  The District Court explained that it looked to the cases 
defining “death results” language in other statutes, namely 
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) and Paroline v. 
United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014), to form the basis for its 
causation instruction to the jury.  The District Court then 
explained why it viewed the proximate cause requirement as 
requiring a heightened standard of proof here compared to that 
required under general tort law. 
 
 We hold that the District Court did not err in crafting 
the jury instruction for the “death results” enhancement.  The 
District Court properly followed Burrage and Paroline.  In 
Burrage, the Supreme Court held that a “death results” 
sentencing enhancement in the Controlled Substances Act “is 
an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond 
a reasonable doubt,” because it “increased the minimum and 
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maximum sentences to which [the defendant] was exposed.”  
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210.  The Court noted that such language 
meant that “a defendant generally may not be convicted unless 
his conduct is ‘both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the ‘legal’ 
cause (often called the ‘proximate cause’) of the result.’”  Id. 
(quoting 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(a), 
464-66 (2d ed. 2003)).  The Court continued on to discuss the 
“actual cause” standard, determining that it “requires proof 
‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—
that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.”  Id. at 211 (quoting 
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347-48 
(2013)).  The Court did not discuss the proximate cause 
requirement, because it held that the actual cause requirement 
had not been satisfied where there was “no evidence” that the 
conduct at issue “was an independently sufficient cause of . . . 
death.”  Id. at 190. 
 
The Court did address in detail the concept of proximate 
cause in Paroline.  It observed that “a requirement of proximate 
cause is more restrictive than a requirement of factual cause 
alone,” and that “proximate cause forecloses liability in 
situations where the causal link between conduct and result is 
so attenuated that the so-called consequence is more akin to 
mere fortuity.”  572 U.S. at 446, 448.  The Court struggled to 
define proximate cause, noting that it “defies easy summary” 
and “is ‘a flexible concept.’”  Id. at 444 (quoting Bridge v. 
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008)).  It 
determined that “to say that one event was a proximate cause 
of another means that it was not just any cause, but one with a 
sufficient connection to the result.”  Id.  The Court observed 
that the proximate cause analysis in criminal and tort law “is 
parallel in many instances.”  Id.  In its discussion, the Court 
noted that proximate cause is typically explained “in terms of 
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foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate 
conduct.”  Id. at 445. 
 
We hold that the District Court did not erroneously 
configure the portion of the “death results” instruction as to the 
direct theory of liability.  The “actual cause” part of the District 
Court’s instruction appropriately tracks the “but for” causation 
requirement of Burrage.  571 U.S. at 211.  And the District 
Court’s instruction on proximate cause required even a more 
stringent finding than that discussed by the Supreme Court in 
Paroline.  Not only did the District Court require that the jury 
find Belford’s “death was a reasonably foreseeable result of the 
particular offense,” as is traditionally considered the proximate 
cause requirement, but also the District Court went further, 
requiring that the death result from the offense “in a real and 
meaningful way” and as a “natural consequence.”  App. 5871.  
The defendants have pointed to no authority that such a 
standard is insufficient to satisfy the proximate cause 
requirement.  Thus, if anything, the District Court’s instruction 
on proximate cause provided more protection for the 
defendants’ rights than necessary under Supreme Court 
precedent.  Accordingly, it was certainly not plain error for the 
District Court to give this instruction.   
 
 Additionally, the District Court also properly instructed 
the jury that they could find the defendants liable under an 
alternative, co-conspirator theory of liability.  The District 
Court’s instruction on when conspirators can be held liable for 
the actions of their co-conspirators was not plain error as it 
followed this Court’s model jury instructions and precedent.  
See Third Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury Instruction § 7.03 
“Responsibility For Substantive Offenses Committed By Co-
Conspirators (Pinkerton Liability).”  We have held that “a 
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participant in a conspiracy is liable for the reasonably 
foreseeable acts of his coconspirators in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 311 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 
(1946)).  This is known as the Pinkerton theory of liability.  
This doctrine “permits the government to prove the guilt of one 
defendant through the acts of another committed within the 
scope of and in furtherance of a conspiracy of which the 
defendant was a member, provided the acts are reasonably 
foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the 
conspiracy.”  United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did 
not plainly err in following our precedent and model jury 
instructions when instructing the jury that it could rely on co-
conspirator liability.   
 
C. Substantive Challenges to the Prosecution of the Case 
 
1. First Amendment 
 
 Gonzalez argues that the indictment should have been 
dismissed because it violated the First Amendment.  She brings 
an as-applied challenge to the cyberstalking statute.  David 
joins Gonzalez’s First Amendment arguments, but does not 
provide any separate discussion for an as-applied challenge as 
to his conduct.  We review constitutional claims de novo.  
Garcia v. Att’y Gen, 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
 Gonzalez argues that she cannot be convicted for 
violating § 2261A(2) because her conduct constituted protected 
speech under the First Amendment.  She argues that her speech 
— which consisted of, inter alia, sending emails to her co-
defendants, sending correspondence to Belford and her 
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children, contacting third parties, posting polygraph results and 
videos with accompanying commentary — was protected 
because she was expressing her sincerely held belief about 
Belford.  She contends that her speech about Belford 
constituted an opinion, and as such receives complete 
protection under the First Amendment.10  The Government 
                                              
10 Gonzalez also briefly includes a vagueness and 
overbreadth challenge to the statute as a whole, which she 
supports with virtually no analysis.  These challenges fail.  “In 
the First Amendment context . . . a law may be invalidated as 
overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.’”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).  The 
Supreme Court has counseled that an overbreadth challenge is 
unlikely to “succeed against a law or regulation that is not 
specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily 
associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).”  
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003).  Furthermore, a 
statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it either (1) “fails to 
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits” or (2) 
“authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).  To 
this end, we consider whether a statute’s prohibitions “are set 
out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary 
common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.”  
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 
U.S. 548, 579 (1973).   
 Section 2261A is neither overbroad nor 
unconstitutionally vague.  It is not targeted at “speech or to 
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argues that this statute does not violate the First Amendment 
because it prohibits conduct, and any speech included in its 
breadth falls into an exception that does not warrant First 
Amendment protection. 
 
 The First Amendment “permit[s] restrictions upon the 
content of speech in a few limited areas.”  United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992)).  The Supreme Court 
has identified certain “well-defined and narrowly limited 
                                              
conduct necessarily associated with speech,” but with 
harassing and intimidating conduct that is unprotected by the First 
Amendment.  Thus, because “a substantial number of the 
statute’s applications” are not unconstitutional, it is not 
overbroad.  Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6.  And, it 
is not unconstitutionally vague, as it uses readily 
understandable terms such as “harass” and “intimidate,” and 
requires that a defendant intend to cause victims serious harm 
and in fact cause a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily 
injury.  Thus, an “ordinary person exercising ordinary common 
sense can sufficiently understand and comply with” the terms 
of this statute.  U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 413 U.S. at 579.  
Every one of our sister Courts of Appeals to consider similar 
overbreadth and vagueness challenges to § 2261A has rejected 
them.  See United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 385-86 (5th 
Cir. 2015); United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 944-45 (9th 
Cir. 2014); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 436 (1st Cir. 
2014); United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 854-56 (8th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 310 (4th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 379-83 (6th Cir. 
2004).  The defendants have provided no authority or analysis 
to the contrary. 
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classes of speech” that can be proscribed without implicating the 
First Amendment.  Id. at 468-69 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).  Relevant here, 
these classes of speech include (1) “defamation” and (2) 
“speech integral to criminal conduct.”  Id. at 468. 
 
 As to the first class of speech, the Supreme Court has 
held that defamatory statements are not protected by the First 
Amendment, reasoning that “[r]esort to epithets or personal 
abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information 
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment 
as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.”  
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952) (quoting 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).  And while 
statements of personal opinion are protected under the First 
Amendment, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
339-40 (1974), “there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact,” id. at 340.  False statements of fact are not 
protected because “[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless 
error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”  Id. (quoting 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1970)).   
 
 As to the second class of speech, the Supreme Court has 
long maintained that speech integral to engaging in criminal 
conduct does not warrant First Amendment protection.  See 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).  
Thus, “[s]pecific criminal acts are not protected speech even if 
speech is the means for their commission.”  Packingham v. 
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).  In Giboney, the 
Court held that enjoining otherwise lawful picketing activities 
did not violate the First Amendment where the sole purpose of 
that picketing was to force a company to enter an unlawful 
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agreement in violation of Missouri’s criminal antitrust laws.  
336 U.S. at 501-02.  The Court reasoned that such a restraint 
was justified because the otherwise lawful expressive activity 
was done for “the sole immediate purpose of continuing a 
violation of law.”  Id. at 501.  The Court “reject[ed] the 
contention” that “the constitutional freedom for speech and 
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an 
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”  
Id. at 498.  The Court reasoned that “[s]uch an expansive 
interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and 
press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws 
against . . . agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to 
society.”  Id. at 502. 
 
 We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A does not violate the 
First Amendment as applied to Gonzalez, because she did not 
engage in protected speech.  Her conduct was both defamatory 
and speech integral to criminal conduct.  The defendants 
published false information about Belford on the internet and 
to third parties.  Gonzalez, acting along with the other members 
of her family as a member of the conspiracy, defamed Belford 
by falsely labeling her as a mentally unfit abuser who sexually 
molested her own children.  In addition, the members of the 
conspiracy defamed the children by falsely labeling them as 
victims of their mother’s sexual abuse.  There is 
overwhelming, uncontradicted evidence that the accusations 
that Belford sexually molested and abused her children were 
false.11  Falsely accusing Belford of sexual assault is 
                                              
11 This evidence includes:  (1) the testimony of L.M.1, 
the child who was alleged to be abused, denying any abuse 
occurred; (2) medical testimony corroborating L.M.1’s denial 
of abuse; (3) materially inconsistent statements by the 
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unquestionably defamatory and not protected by the First 
Amendment.  See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 257 (“[I]t is 
libelous falsely to charge another with being a rapist.”).  That 
Gonzalez claims to have sincerely held this belief, in light of 
the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, does not transform 
such a statement of fact into an opinion.  Id.  As “there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact,” Gonzalez’s 
speech on this ground does not warrant First Amendment 
protection.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
 
Even if it were not defamatory, this speech is still 
unprotected as it falls squarely into the “speech integral to 
criminal conduct” exception.  The defendants’ speech served 
no legitimate purpose other than to harass and intimidate 
Belford, conduct that is illegal under § 2261A.  Thus, the 
speech was that which had a “sole immediate purpose of 
continuing a violation of law.”  Giboney, 366 U.S. at 501.  As 
discussed above, the evidence produced at trial sufficiently 
demonstrated that the defendants’ conduct was part of a course 
of conduct targeted at Belford, intended to cause her distress 
and to obtain custody of her children.  Thus, Gonzalez’s 
internet postings and letters sent to Belford, the children, and 
third parties were actions that were integral to the course of 
conduct and the illegal purpose of the criminal cyberstalking 
conspiracy.  As such, this conduct is not protected by the First 
Amendment. 
                                              
defendants regarding their claims of abuse; (4) the fact that the 
no claims of abuse were made until well after the kidnapping 
charges were brought; (5) testimony from Belford’s mental 
health providers; and (6) the analysis and conclusions found in 
the order of the Delaware Family Court terminating David’s 
parental rights and his family’s familial rights.   
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Our decision is in accord with those of our sister Courts 
of Appeals that have had the opportunity to consider First 
Amendment challenges to § 2261A.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 434 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated 
on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005), reinstated in relevant 
part, 125 Fed. App’x 701 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 
In Petrovic, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
held that the defendant’s conduct, including making highly 
offensive online communications, “may be proscribed 
consistent with the First Amendment.”  Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 
856.  There, the defendant had created a website through which 
he disseminated sexually explicit images and false statements 
about his ex-wife.  Id. at 852.  He also sent mailings to third 
parties who knew the victim, including her family and co-
workers, which contained similar information.  Id.  Based on 
these facts, the court concluded that these communications 
“were integral to this criminal conduct as they constituted the 
means of carrying out his extortionate threats.”  Id. at 855.  The 
court reached its conclusion due to the fact that “[s]ection 
2261A(2)(A) is directed toward ‘course[s] of conduct,’ not 
speech, and the conduct it proscribes is not ‘necessarily 
associated with speech.’”  Id. at 856 (citation omitted).  This is 
“[b]ecause the statute requires both malicious intent on the part 
of the defendant and substantial harm to the victim.”  Id.   
 
In Sayer, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
rejected a First Amendment challenge to a conviction under 
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§ 2261A(2)(A).  748 F.3d at 435.  There, the defendant 
“creat[ed] false online advertisements and accounts in [the 
victim’s] name [and] impersonat[ed the victim] on the internet 
. . . which deceptively enticed men to [the victim’s] home.”  Id. 
at 434.  The court concluded that “[t]o the extent his course of 
conduct targeting [the victim] involved speech at all, his 
speech is not protected,” because “it served only to implement 
[his] criminal purpose.”  Id.  The court went on to observe that 
by prohibiting “a course of conduct done with ‘intent to kill, 
injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, 
injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional 
distress,’” the statute “clearly targets conduct performed with 
serious criminal intent, not just speech that happens to cause 
annoyance or insult.”  Id. at 435 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2261A(2)).   
 
 In Osinger, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reached a similar conclusion.  There, the defendant sent 
“threatening text messages” to the victim and “designed a false 
Facebook page and sent emails to [her] co-workers containing 
nude photographs of [her].”  753 F.3d at 947.  The court held 
that “[a]ny expressive aspects of [the defendant’s] speech were 
not protected under the First Amendment because they were 
‘integral to criminal conduct’ in intentionally harassing, 
intimidating or causing substantial emotional distress to [the 
victim].”  Id.  This was because the defendant was engaged in 
a course of conduct with the intent to harass or intimidate the 
victim.  Id.   
 
 In Conlan, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
similarly concluded that “§ 2261A does not criminalize 
constitutionally protected free expression.”  786 F.3d at 386.  
There, the defendant conducted a “year-long campaign of 
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escalating sexual innuendo, threats of physical violence, and 
unwanted contacts with [the victims’] family, friends, and 
colleagues, culminating in an interstate trip to his victims’ 
house.”  Id.  The court concluded that because “one must both 
intend to cause victims serious harm and in fact cause a 
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury” to violate the 
statute, it criminalized conduct and not free expression 
protected by the Constitution.  Id. 
 
 Each of these decisions supports our holding today.  
Here, what makes the defendants’ conduct violative of § 
2261A(2) is not that they simply made statements expressing 
their beliefs about Belford, but that these statements were sent 
to Belford, the children, and third parties as part of an 
extensive, and successful, campaign to threaten, intimidate, and 
harass Belford.  As our sister Courts of Appeals have concluded, 
it is the intent with which the defendants’ engaged in this 
conduct, and the effect this conduct had on the victims, that 
makes what the defendants did a criminal violation.  See 
Conlan, 786 F.3d at 386; Osinger, 753 F.3d at 947; Sayer, 748 
F.3d at 435; Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 856.  Accordingly, we reject 
the defendants’ First Amendment challenge, and will affirm 
the District Court’s decision to decline to dismiss the case on 
First Amendment grounds.  The defendants’ convictions do not 
violate the First Amendment.   
 
2. Venue in Delaware 
 
 The defendants also argue that the District Court did not 
have “jurisdiction” to preside over the case.  This argument is 
based on the defendants’ interpretation of an order from the 
district court judge first assigned to the case, Judge Gregory M. 
Sleet, which they claim transferred the case out of the district.  
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The defendants contend that because he then recused himself, 
Judge Sleet was not permitted to enter a later clarifying order 
specifying that he did not transfer the case in this earlier order.  
They also argue that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, Judge 
McHugh, who took over the case after all of the district judges 
in the District of Delaware were recused, was bound to transfer 
the case out of the district.  We review a judge’s decision to 
reconsider his or her predecessor’s ruling for an abuse of 
discretion.  Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
 On September 12, 2014, Judge Sleet granted the 
defendants’ motions for recusal, and recused himself from the 
case.  Gonzalez’s recusal motion was titled “Motion for 
Transfer and Recusal,” and it requested a transfer of venue in 
addition to Judge Sleet’s recusal.  App. 16-23.  The 
memorandum opinion accompanying Judge Sleet’s order did 
not mention venue transfer.  See id.  The defendants argued 
that in addition to recusing himself, and all of the district judges 
in the District of Delaware, from the case, this order also 
transferred venue out of the District of Delaware.  The 
Government disputed that characterization, and the parties then 
briefed the issue.  On December 4, 2014, Judge Sleet issued an 
amended order that clarified that the Motion for Transfer and 
Recusal was granted in part, as to recusal only.  App. 24.  
Nonetheless, the defendants filed motions to enforce Judge 
Sleet’s transfer of venue.  On March 10, 2015, Judge McHugh 
issued an order, ruling on those motions to enforce, and finding 
that Judge Sleet never granted the venue-transfer portion of the 
motion to transfer.  App. 25-29.  The defendants argue that this 
was an abuse of discretion.  We disagree. 
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 Judge Sleet’s memorandum opinion clearly did not 
transfer venue, because venue transfer is not mentioned in the 
opinion.  Because venue transfer was not discussed, Judge Sleet 
thus also did not identify to what judicial district venue the case 
was purportedly transferred or the reasons for that transfer.  
Without such explanations, venue could not properly be 
transferred.  See In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 
2001) (requiring the district court to provide “a statement of 
reasons for granting the motion to transfer so that the appellate 
court has a basis to determine whether the district court soundly 
exercised its discretion and considered the appropriate factors” 
that contains “a sufficient explanation of the factors 
considered, the weight accorded them, and the balancing 
performed”).  That this order did not and was never intended to 
transfer venue is confirmed by the amended order, which 
clarified that the prior order granted the motion only as to 
recusal and not as to venue transfer.  We have held that “[t]he 
law of the case doctrine does not preclude a trial judge from 
clarifying or correcting an earlier, ambiguous ruling.”  Fagan, 
22 F.3d at 1290.  That is what Judge Sleet did here.  Thus, 
Judge McHugh did not abuse his discretion by failing to transfer 
venue, because Judge Sleet’s opinions make clear that venue was 
never transferred. 
 
D. Evidentiary Challenges 
 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  United States 
v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 348 (3d Cir. 2011).  We review the 
District Court’s application of the Rules and its decisions to 
admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.  Id.  The 
District Court abuses its discretion if its analysis and 
conclusions are “arbitrary or irrational,” or if its “decision 
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‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  
United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 198 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2001), and United States v. 
Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 
2000) (en banc)). 
 
1. Family Court Opinion 
 
 The defendants argue that the District Court erred by 
admitting into evidence the August 18, 2011 TPR Order from 
the Delaware Family Court.  See App. 7827-68 (Gov. Ex. 308).  
By way of the TPR Order, the Delaware Family Court 
terminated David’s parental rights, as well as the familial rights 
of his sister, Gonzalez, and their parents, with respect to 
David’s children.  The defendants argue that the TPR Order 
should have been excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 because any probative value that it provided was 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  They 
contend that factual findings as well as the statements about 
David contained in the TPR Order could have prejudiced the 
jury, since these statements were made by a judge.  Further, 
they assert that introducing the findings of a judge would 
prejudice the jury because they would be likely to defer to these 
findings and not reach an independent verdict.  The defendants 
also argue that the TPR Order constituted improper character 
evidence because it painted David as a liar and manipulator and 
was evidence of his prior bad acts which should not have been 
admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
 
 The defendants filed a motion in limine to have the TPR 
Order excluded pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b).  The District 
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Court denied the motion, and admitted the TPR Order as 
relevant to the defendants’ “state of mind and motive in 
continuing to make allegations against” Belford and as to their 
motive for engaging in the stalking.  App. 51.  The court 
admitted the TPR Order with a cautionary instruction.  App. 
51.  It also further explained its ruling from the bench, after 
defense counsel again objected to the TPR Order being sent to 
the jury.  App. 5753-54.  The District Court made redactions to 
the TPR Order that were “carefully considered to remove from 
the jury’s consideration the evidence that would really be 
prejudicial.”  App. 5753.  The court also observed that the risk 
of prejudice was lessened by the fact that most of the witnesses 
who testified during the TPR hearing also testified at trial, and 
that the one who did not, Dr. Orlov, was available to be called 
by the defense, who chose not to do so.  
 
The District Court gave multiple cautionary 
instructions.  The first was immediately after the TPR Order 
was admitted into evidence and discussed by the Government’s 
witness.  See App. 2153-54.  The court instructed that the TPR 
Order, which included the Family Court’s findings that 
David’s accusations of abuse by the children’s mother were 
false, “does not definitively conclude that no abuse took place 
because that issue is in front of the Court here.”  App. 2153.  
The District Court went on to explain that “what you just heard 
about what the Family Court held might be considered as 
relevant to potentially a motive for future things that occurred 
including the stalking that the Government alleges occurred.”  
App. 2153-54.  The court also explained that the findings “are 
not automatically binding on you” and should be considered in 
light of all the evidence that the jury hears.  App. 2154. 
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 The District Court provided a second cautionary 
instruction during the recitation of jury instructions.  It 
cautioned the jury that 
 
[t]hese materials were allowed into evidence to 
provide you with background for the offenses 
charged here.  You may consider the findings 
made in Family Court in determining the 
defendant’s state of mind, including knowledge, 
intent and motive with respect to the offenses 
charged in this indictment. 
 You should not, however, conclude 
simply because the Family Court made certain 
factual findings that you are bound by those 
findings.  As I’ve told you it is your duty to 
decide the fact from the evidence you’ve heard 
and seen in court during this trial.  That is your 
job and yours only. 
 
App. 5655. 
 
Rule 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:  unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  
Rule 403 “creates a presumption of admissibility.”  United 
States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).  In 
considering a challenge under Rule 403, “the trial court ‘must 
appraise the genuine need for the challenged evidence and 
balance that necessity against the risk of prejudice to the 
defendant.’” Gov’t of V.I. v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 (3d 
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Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Blyden, 964 F.2d 1375, 1378 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
 
Typically, “we exercise great restraint in reviewing a 
district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under 
Rule 403.”  Id.  However, we do not defer to the district court 
where “the trial judge fails to perform the required balancing 
and to explain the grounds for denying a Rule 403 objection.”  
Id.  Where, as here, a district court applies Rule 403 to 
“determine the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence,” the 
district court “must undertake some analysis, i.e., provide 
‘meaningful balancing.’”  United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 
230, 246 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 
760 F.3d 267, 283 (3d Cir. 2014)).   
 
The defendants contend that the admissibility of the 
TPR Order should be subject to plenary review, because the 
District Court did not sufficiently explain the reasoning of its 
Rule 403 ruling.  We disagree.  The District Court properly 
engaged in the requisite balancing and “articulate[d] . . . a 
rational explanation” for its ruling.  United States v. Sampson, 
980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1992).  The District Court in fact 
issued a written ruling on the admissibility of the TPR Order, 
which noted the relevance of the evidence and acknowledged 
that a cautionary instruction was needed to address the 
concerns raised by the defendants.  See App. 51.  Additionally, 
the District Court gave further reasons for its ruling from the 
bench.  App. 5753-54.  These explanations warrant deference 
as they far exceed the “bare recitation of Rule 403” that we 
have held is insufficient to warrant deference.  See, e.g., Repak, 
852 F.3d at 246.  The District Court explained why the TPR 
Order was relevant, observed that its prejudicial effect was 
mitigated by the redactions as well as the fact that the findings 
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in the TPR Order were based on the testimony of witnesses 
who either testified or were available to testify at trial, and only 
admitted the TPR order for a limited purpose under Rule 
404(b),12 with the appropriate limiting instructions.  
Accordingly, we will review the Rule 403 ruling for abuse of 
discretion.  
 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the TPR Order.  The TPR Order was highly relevant 
and was a key piece of evidence in the case as it was the 
Government’s argument that the TPR Order was one of the 
main motivating factors that spurred the killing of Belford.  
The Government argued that David was particularly angered 
by the specific language used in the TPR Order.  The 
Government, in fact, introduced a version of the TPR Order 
annotated with the defendants’ handwritten notes as evidence 
of the effect that it had on them.  See App. 7323.  Further, this 
was used as evidence that the defendants believed the 
Delaware Family Court had let them down, and the Government 
argued that the detailed examination and rejection of the 
defendants’ claims that the children were abused contained in 
the TPR Order rebuts the defendants’ central defense in this 
case that they were not intending to harass Belford, but were 
instead just attempting to raise awareness for their claims of 
abuse and have them be heard.  The District Court did not 
                                              
12 Rule 404(b) permits otherwise inadmissible character 
evidence to be admitted if it is used not to show a person’s 
character, but instead for certain limited other purposes.  See 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be admissible for 
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident.”). 
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abuse its discretion in admitting the TPR Order as highly 
relevant to the Government’s case. 
 
 The prejudicial effects about which the defendants 
complain were mitigated by the cautionary instructions that the 
District Court gave to the jury.  “[W]e presume that the jury will 
follow a curative instruction unless there is an ‘overwhelming 
probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow it and a strong 
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be ‘devastating’ 
to the defendant.”  United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 
(3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)).  We 
have ruled that the provision of a limiting instruction can alleviate 
the potential prejudice of evidence admitted over a Rule 403 
objection.  See, e.g., Repak, 852 F.3d at 247 (“[T]he District 
Court provided a limiting instruction, mitigating any concern 
that the jury would have used this evidence to draw a 
propensity inference.”); United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 
748 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he risk of unfair prejudice was 
minimized by the district court’s instruction to the jury on the 
limited use of the sexual assault evidence.”).  The District 
Court gave two thorough curative instructions, in addition to 
redacting the most prejudicial parts of the TPR Order.  The jury 
was expressly instructed that it was not bound by anything said 
in TPR Order and that it was to use it in considering the 
defendants’ state of mind in committing the stalking offenses, 
and not for other impermissible purposes.13  The curative 
                                              
13 Any potential prejudice from the TPR Order was 
further limited by the fact that, during closing arguments, the 
Government incorporated the cautionary instruction and 
qualified its arguments to explicitly note that the TPR Order 
was nonbinding.  See App. 5442, 5593. 
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instructions here were sufficient to ameliorate the alleged 
unfair prejudice of which the defendants complain. 
 
 Alternatively, the defendants argue that the TPR Order 
was unduly prejudicial because it was issued by a court and the 
jury would feel bound to follow the finding of a judge, even 
with the limiting instruction.  They argue that we should follow 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United 
States v. Sine, in which that court observed “that factual 
testimony from a judge unduly can affect a jury” and that 
“jurors are likely to defer to findings and determinations 
relevant to credibility made by an authoritative, professional 
factfinder rather than determine those issues for themselves.”  
493 F.3d 1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007).  However, Sine is 
distinguishable.  There, the government chose to present the 
factual findings from a prior civil case in which the defendant 
was involved in lieu of other evidence to prove those same 
facts at trial, and sought to rely on the fact that these factual 
findings were found by a judge, as a method of reinforcing the 
truth of the findings.  Id. at 1035.  The court held that it was 
improper for the government to attempt to usurp the jury’s role 
as a factfinder in this way, and that the admission of these 
findings in lieu of the direct evidence constituted inadmissible 
hearsay.  Id. at 1033, 1036.  As discussed above, none of these 
concerns are present here, where the Government did not 
attempt to present the TPR Order for the truth of the factual 
findings, presented the testimony of the witnesses from the 
TPR hearing in its case, and itself stressed the Court’s limiting 
instruction.   
 
 In sum, in light of the limiting instruction and the 
redactions, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the TPR Order. 
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2. Belford’s Therapy Tapes and Emails 
 
 The defendants next argue that the District Court abused 
its discretion in admitting Belford’s statements to her therapist 
as part of her therapy sessions as well as emails Belford sent to 
her neighbors and colleagues.  The defendants argue that these 
statements are hearsay, and they were not properly admitted 
under any hearsay exception, such as Rules 803(3) and 803(4).  
The defendants also argue that the admission of this evidence 
violated their rights under the Confrontation Clause.   
 
The defendants objected at trial to the admission of this 
evidence.  Therefore, they contend that the abuse of discretion 
standard should be applied.  The Government argues that 
although this evidence was objected to, the defendants did not 
raise the same arguments as to its inadmissibility that they now 
raise, and thus we should review the admissibility of this 
evidence for plain error.  We need not resolve this dispute, 
because even under the more deferential abuse of discretion 
standard, the District Court properly admitted this evidence. 
 
a. Therapy Sessions 
 
 The defendants first object to the admission of portions 
of recordings taken of Belford’s sixteen therapy sessions to 
treat her anxiety and depression with Dawn Edgar, her 
therapist.  Edgar testified at trial, and these recordings were 
admitted through her testimony as evidence of Belford’s state 
of mind.  The Government contends that they are admissible 
under two separate hearsay exceptions:  (1) as evidence of the 
declarant’s state of mind, and (2) as a statement made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  Fed. R. Evid. 
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803(3) & (4).  Rule 803(4) provides a hearsay exception for a 
“Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment,” which 
is defined as follows:  “A statement that: (A) is made for—and 
is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and 
(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or 
sensations; their inception; or their general cause.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 803(4).   
 
 The defendants argue that Belford’s statements to her 
therapist are not covered by Rule 803(4), because this 
exception should not apply to statements made to mental health 
professionals.  They contend that statements made to mental 
health professionals do not exhibit the same indicia of reliability 
as do statements made to other medical professionals.  The 
defendants claim that these statements are unreliable because 
the issue of the truth of a patient’s statements regarding his or 
her mental condition is not as relevant for mental health 
professionals as it is for physical health doctors.  As a result, 
the defendants argue that the statements were not made for 
“medical diagnosis or treatment,” and thus do not qualify for 
the Rule 803(4) exception.    
 
We disagree.  We have not previously decided whether 
Rule 803(4) covers statements made to a mental health 
professional, rather than to a physician.  However, the plain 
text of the Rule does not limit its application to statements 
made to a physician.  Rule 803(4) focuses on the purpose for 
which the statement is made, not on the identity of the 
recipient.  The advisory committee note to Rule 803(4) makes 
clear that statements made to a broad category of individuals 
other than physicians are covered by the exception, such as 
those made to “hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even 
members of the family.”  Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee 
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note to paragraph (4).  There is no indication from Rule 803(4) 
or its accompanying advisory committee notes that it should 
not extend to statements made to mental health professionals.  
The defendants have provided no persuasive authority in 
support of their position.  If Rule 803(4) extends to cover 
statements made to non-medical persons such as family 
members, it logically also covers statements made to other 
medical professionals, including those who specialize in 
mental health.  Accordingly, we hold that the exception in Rule 
803(4) applies to statements made to therapists and mental 
health professionals.   
 
The decisions of our sister Courts of Appeals support 
this conclusion, as every Court of Appeals to consider this 
issue has determined that statements made to a mental health 
professional for purposes of diagnosis or treatment qualify 
under the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4).  See, e.g., United 
States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 297 (1st Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 n.17 (4th Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 89 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
abrogated on other grounds by In re Sealed Case, 352 F.3d 409 
(D.C. Cir. 2003).   
 
Belford made the statements in question to her therapist, 
who she was consulting for treatment of her anxiety and 
depression.  Thus, these statements were made for “medical 
diagnosis or treatment.”  Fed. R. Evid. 803(4)(A).  These 
statements concerned Belford’s emotional state, including 
discussions of her anxiety and depression, as well as their 
cause.  These types of statements are plainly within the 
confines of Rule 803(4)(B) as they are a description of 
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Belford’s “past or present symptoms or sensations; their 
inception; or their general cause.”  Fed. R. Evid. 803(4)(B).  
Accordingly, we hold that Belford’s statements to her therapist 
were admissible pursuant to Rule 803(4).14  
                                              
14 In the alternative, the Government argues that these 
recordings are admissible pursuant to Rule 803(3), the state of 
mind exception.  The District Court admitted them because it 
found that they qualified under Rule 803(3) to show Belford’s 
emotional state, which was a necessary element of the charges.  
Rule 803(3) provides that: 
 
A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state 
of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or 
emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such 
as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to 
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s 
will. 
 
Belford’s statements to her therapist consist of Belford’s 
description of her emotional condition.  As the District Court 
correctly observed, the recorded nature of the statements was 
relevant to showing Belford’s state of mind because the tenor 
of her voice in the recordings provided strong evidence of her 
emotional condition at the time.  These statements were 
admitted to show the effect that the defendants’ stalking 
campaign had on Belford and her resulting emotional state, not 
for the truth of what she was saying.  Belford’s emotional 
condition and state of mind are directly relevant to the 
Government’s burden to prove that the defendants’ actions 
caused her substantial emotional distress.  Accordingly, this 
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b. Emails 
 
 The second set of hearsay challenges that the defendants 
bring are to emails that Belford sent to third parties.  These 
emails concerned Belford’s emotional condition.  The 
defendants argue that these emails were inadmissible because 
they contained more than just a description of Belford’s 
emotional state, as they also contained explanations of the facts 
that were the cause of that emotional state.  The defendants 
contend that under the Rule 803(3) hearsay state of mind 
exception, the hearsay statements cannot encompass the facts 
that create the relevant state of mind.  The Government 
contends that these emails were not admitted to show the truth 
of the descriptions of the defendants’ acts contained therein, 
but to demonstrate that Belford was aware of the acts.  The 
Government also identifies the other admissible evidence at 
trial that established these acts by the defendants.  Thus, it 
contends, any descriptions of the acts in Belford’s emails 
would be harmless, because these acts were already before the 
jury.  See Gov. Br. 120 n.66 (identifying the portions of the 
record where the acts described in the emails were also 
described by other witnesses). 
 
 We hold that the District Court properly admitted these 
emails under the Rule 803(3) state of mind exception.  The 
emails offer Belford’s descriptions of the defendants’ acts in the 
context of how those acts affected her emotional state, fitting 
squarely within the state of mind exception.  These emails 
demonstrate that Belford was aware of defendants’ actions and 
that those actions were causing her emotional distress, which 
                                              
evidence squarely fits within Rule 803(3) and are also 
admissible under that rule. 
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are both substantive elements of the cyberstalking offense that 
the Government was required to prove.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2261A(2).  Accordingly, these emails demonstrated 
Belford’s “state of mind” and “emotional . . . condition,” Fed. 
R. Evid. 803(3), and thus do not constitute hearsay.  We hold 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
this evidence under Rule 803(3).15 
 
c. Confrontation Clause 
 
The defendants also challenge the admission of all of 
Belford’s statements at trial under the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment.  They contend that their rights were 
violated by the admission of this evidence, which they contend 
constitutes testimony by Belford, because they were unable to 
cross-examine Belford at trial.  
 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
                                              
15 Additionally, these statements also qualify as non-
hearsay under Rule 801(c) because the Government was not 
offering them for the truth of the matter asserted in those 
statements.  See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) advisory committee note 
(“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the 
fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of 
anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”); see also 
United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1026 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“Statements proffered to show something other than the 
accuracy of their contents—to show, say, the knowledge or 
state of mind of the declarant or one in conversation with 
him—are not considered hearsay.” (citing VI Wigmore on 
Evidence § 1789 at 235 (3d ed. 1940))).   
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enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  A “witness” is any individual who 
bears “testimony” against the defendant, and such “testimony” 
can be contained in any functional equivalent of a witness’s in-
court statements, such as affidavits or “pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 
(2004).  To fall within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause, 
proposed evidence must constitute a “statement,” and such a 
statement must contain testimonial hearsay, meaning that the 
statement was “a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact;’ and . . . was 
made primarily for the purpose of ‘prov[ing] past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”  United 
States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 272 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration 
in original) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009); then quoting 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361 (2011)).  Examples of 
testimonial statements include “prior testimony” as well as 
“police interrogations.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.   
 
 The defendants contend that Belford’s prior statements 
to her therapist as presented in the recordings were testimonial 
in nature.  They argue that a therapy session “mimic[s]” the 
format of a law enforcement interview of a crime victim, 
because both scenarios are a “structured setting” that involves 
questioning.  Gonzalez Br. 66.  They also argue that the two 
are similar because both involve discussions of unlawful 
conduct.   
 
 We disagree.  Belford’s statements to her therapist are 
not testimonial in nature.  As her therapist testified, the purpose 
of Belford’s visits were to receive therapy to treat her anxiety 
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and depression.  The purpose of a visit to a therapist is not to 
create a record for a future criminal case.  As we discussed 
previously, these statements were not hearsay because they 
were made for the purposes of “medical diagnosis or 
treatment.”  Fed. R. Evid. 803(4)(A).  Indeed, as the Supreme 
Court has observed, many of the hearsay exceptions, including 
Rule 803(4) “rest on the belief that certain statements are, by 
their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution 
and therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions.”  
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 362 n.9.  It is clear from the record that the 
purpose of Belford’s visits to her therapist was not to create a 
record for a future prosecution that could be used as a substitute 
for trial testimony.  Accordingly, the admission of Belford’s 
statements as evidence did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause. 
 
3. Testimony of FBI Case Agent 
 
 Next, the defendants assert that the District Court erred 
by permitting the FBI case agent to vouch for the strength of 
the Government’s case.  On redirect examination of the case 
agent, the District Court permitted him to respond to the single 
question:  “in the course of your investigation into this matter, 
has anything occurred that has shaken your belief in your 
actions?”  App. 3696.  The case agent responded in the 
negative.  Id.  The District Court permitted this redirect 
question, pursuant to the Government’s request, after counsel 
for co-defendant Lenore on cross-examination asked the case 
agent if he, “at any point in time,” had any “doubts” about the 
defendants’ involvement in Belford’s death.  App. 3638.  
Counsel for the defendants David and Gonzalez did not object 
to this initial line of questioning by counsel for Lenore, but did 
object to the Government’s question on redirect.  The District 
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Court overruled these objections, reasoning that counsel for 
Lenore had opened the door to this redirect question, and 
counsel for David and Gonzalez had implicitly consented to it 
by not objecting to this line of questioning at the time.  
Afterwards, the District Court then provided a limiting 
instruction, informing the jury that it had permitted the 
question in response to questions by defense counsel on cross-
examination and directing the jury that they were to follow 
only their own assessment of the evidence.     
 
 We review for abuse of discretion “the District Court’s 
ruling on a challenge to prosecutorial statements objected to at 
trial.”  United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 325 (3d Cir. 
2007).  And we review a “vouching issue for abuse of 
discretion and harmless error.”  Id.  “Vouching constitutes an 
assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the credibility of a 
Government witness through personal knowledge or by other 
information outside of the testimony before the jury.”  United 
States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 339, 359 n.15 (1958)).  To 
prevail on a vouching claim, a defendant must demonstrate 
that:  “(1) the prosecutor [assured] the jury that the testimony 
of a Government witness is credible; and (2) this assurance is 
based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, or other 
information not contained in the record.”  Id. at 187.  We have 
observed that a “defendant must be able to identify as the basis 
for that comment an explicit or implicit reference to either the 
personal knowledge of the prosecuting attorney or information 
not contained in the record.”  Id.  Impermissible vouching can 
occur through the use of witness testimony.  United States v. 
Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 134 (3d Cir. 2012).  However, “where 
the purported vouching is a ‘reasonable response to allegations 
of [impropriety]’ by the defense, it is not improper.”  Id. 
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(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Weatherly, 525 
F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 
 Here, the challenged statement of the FBI case agent did 
not constitute vouching.  As the District Court acknowledged 
both in overruling the defense objections and in providing the 
limiting instruction to the jury, the challenged question was 
permitted only as a response to the earlier questions on cross-
examination about any doubts the case agent might have had 
about the strength of the case.  The Government’s follow-up 
question was a “reasonable response” to these defense 
questions.  Id.16  Accordingly, we hold that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by permitting this question.  
 
4. Exclusion of Polygraph Rebuttal Evidence 
 
 The defendants next argue that the District Court 
committed reversible error by preventing Gonzalez from 
introducing the results of a polygraph examination as rebuttal 
evidence.  They contend that this violated her right to an 
opportunity to present a meaningful defense under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  They argue that the polygraph 
rebuttal evidence should not have been excluded because it was 
relevant, because the polygraph results are admissible under 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and 
                                              
16 Because we hold that this question was permissible as 
a “reasonable response” to the questions asked by defense 
counsel, we need not decide whether this question and 
response even constitutes vouching due to the fact that neither 
the prosecuting attorney nor the case agent gave a personal 
assurance about the credibility of any witness.  See Walker, 
155 F.3d at 184.   
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because there is no per se rule excluding polygraph results in this 
Circuit.  See United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 
2003).  The defendants contend that this evidence was 
necessary to rebut the prosecution’s challenges to both 
Gonzalez’s veracity and the veracity of statements made in 
another polygraph examination, which was a key part of the 
defendants’ defamation campaign against Belford.  Finally, they 
contend that the exclusion of this evidence unfairly prejudiced 
Gonzalez because it hindered her ability to rebut the 
Government’s assertions that certain statements she made as 
part of her harassment campaign were false and defamatory. 
  
 The District Court provided a supplemental opinion in 
which it explained its decision to exclude this rebuttal 
polygraph evidence.  See App. 62-73.  The District Court 
explained that it could have excluded the evidence on 
procedural grounds because the defendants did not timely or 
properly disclose the experts or summaries of the expert reports 
of those persons who administered this polygraph examination, 
and previously had informed the Government that they would 
not be seeking to admit this evidence.  However, the District 
Court instead chose to exclude this evidence on substantive 
grounds, because it did not find the polygraph results evidence 
to be reliable, but rather found that the defendants improperly 
sought to offer it as direct evidence of the defendants’ guilt or 
innocence.  The District Court looked to recent scientific 
evidence on the reliability of polygraphs examinations, and 
determined that the scientific consensus reinforced doubts 
about their reliability.  
 
 In considering the constitutionality of a rule that 
operated as a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence, the 
Supreme Court has held that “[a] defendant’s right to present 
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relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to 
reasonable restrictions.”  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 
303, 308 (1998).  The Court observed that “federal rulemakers 
have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 
excluding evidence from criminal trials,” and that they had 
“found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally 
arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon 
a weighty interest of the accused.”  Id.  Applying these 
principles, the Court held that because of concerns over the 
reliability of polygraph evidence, a per se exclusion of any 
polygraph evidence did not violate the Constitution.  Id. at 311.  
It determined that a rule excluding polygraph evidence “does 
not implicate any significant interest of the accused” because 
in the absence of polygraph evidence, a defendant still 
maintains the ability to testify on their own behalf and present 
their own factual evidence.  Id. at 316-17.  The Court 
concluded that the exclusion of polygraph evidence does not 
significantly impair a defendant’s defense, as polygraph 
evidence is merely “expert opinion testimony to bolster [the 
defendant’s] own credibility.”  Id. at 317.  
 
 The District Court did not err by excluding Gonzalez’s 
polygraph evidence.  Because a per se rule against polygraph 
evidence is constitutionally permissible, see id. at 311, then the 
District Court’s decision to exclude this polygraph evidence 
after a thorough, well-reasoned, and careful opinion, is 
certainly not an abuse of discretion.  For the reasons articulated 
in its supplemental opinion, the District Court’s concerns about 
the polygraph examination’s reliability were sufficient to 
support its decision to exclude the proffered polygraph rebuttal 
evidence.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
exclusion of the polygraph evidence.   
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5. Character Evidence Cross-Examination 
 
 The defendants next argue that the District Court erred 
in ruling that if Gonzalez called witnesses to testify to her 
character, the Government would be permitted to either cross-
examine those witnesses on Gonzalez’s character or offer some 
evidence in rebuttal.  Gonzalez sought to present the testimony 
of several character witnesses as to her honesty, peacefulness, 
and law-abiding behavior, but declined to do so after the 
District Court ruled that the Government would be permitted 
to provide rebuttal evidence about her involvement in the 
kidnapping of her nieces by David and Lenore.  She contends 
that this denied her the opportunity to put on a complete 
defense. 
 
We disagree.  Rule 404(a) directly addresses this 
situation.  It states that “a defendant may offer evidence of the 
defendant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the 
prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
404(a)(2)(A).  Rule 405 permits “an inquiry into relevant 
specific instances of the person’s conduct” during “cross-
examination of the character witness.”  Fed. R. Evid. 405(a).  
The District Court was well within the bounds of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence when it ruled that it would permit the 
Government to present rebuttal evidence if Gonzalez opened 
the door on the issue of her character.  Accordingly, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in making this ruling.  
Further, by electing not to put on such evidence, Gonzalez 
failed to preserve this issue for appeal.  See United States v. 
Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1305-06 (3d Cir. 1996).17 
                                              
17 The defendants also contend that the cumulative 
effect of these evidentiary errors was prejudicial.  This 
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E. Sentencing Challenges 
 
The defendants also raise four challenges to their 
sentences.  They bring a challenge under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the District Court’s factual findings, 
challenges to the District Court’s application of the Official 
Victim and Vulnerable Victim Guidelines, and an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to the length of Gonzalez’s sentence.  
“We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and constitutional 
questions.”  United States v. Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  And, “[w]e review the District Court’s factual 
findings for clear error, and the District Court’s application of 
those facts to the Guidelines for an abuse of discretion.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).   
 
1. Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
 
The defendants contend that the District Court violated 
both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in calculating their 
advisory Sentencing Guidelines ranges using a preponderance 
of the evidence standard to make additional findings of fact.  
They argue that the District Court should only have applied 
factual findings made beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury 
and should not have made any additional factual findings.  
They contend that the District Court’s actions violate the 
Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence following 
                                              
cumulative error challenge was not raised below, and thus is 
subject to review for plain error.  Because none of the rulings 
was an error, by definition, the cumulative effect of each non-
error could not be prejudicial.   
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  We disagree.  The District Court 
did not violate Apprendi because it did not make any findings 
that raised the defendants’ sentences above the statutory 
maximum.  Instead the District Court’s findings adjusted the 
applicable range of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.   
 
We have previously rejected the defendants’ position in 
an en banc decision, where we held that Apprendi does not 
apply when a district court makes factual findings that affect 
the advisory guidelines but not the statutory maximum.  See 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 
banc).  In Grier we confronted a similar challenge and held 
“that the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
apply to facts relevant to enhancements under an advisory 
Guidelines regime.”  Id.  Nevertheless, the defendants argue 
that we should not follow the binding precedent of Grier 
because intervening decisions by the Supreme Court, such as 
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), have cast doubt 
on its reasoning.  However, we have expressly rejected that 
position and continued to follow Grier.  See United States v. 
Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (determining that 
Alleyne “did not curtail a sentencing court’s ability to find facts 
relevant in selecting a sentence within the prescribed statutory 
range”).   
 
 Although the defendants encourage us to follow the 
dissenting opinion in Grier, we are bound to follow Grier and 
Smith.  Here, the statutory maximum was life imprisonment.  
18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(1).  The District Court made additional 
factual findings to apply the First Degree Murder sentencing 
cross-reference, which “applies when death results from the 
commission of certain felonies.”  U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 cmt. n.1.  
This increased the defendants’ Guidelines range.  But the 
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District Court’s findings did not increase the statutory 
maximum.  Thus, the District Court did not run afoul of 
Apprendi.  530 U.S. at 490.  In sum, the District Court did not 
violate the defendants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.18 
  
2. Official Victim Enhancement 
 
 The defendants19 next contend that the District Court 
erred in applying the Official Victim enhancement in the 
Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1), to David.  The 
Official Victim enhancement, in relevant part, applies 
 
                                              
18 We decline to consider the additional challenge to his 
Guideline range that David seeks to incorporate by reference 
to his arguments made before the District Court.  See 
Matusiewicz Br. 82 (“The defense also presented two 
alternative advisory Guidelines ranges based on other 
Guidelines, but the district court ignored these arguments. The 
defense also argued, and incorporates here, that the cross-
reference could not be applied on the basis of relevant 
conduct.”).  By failing to include this argument in his brief, it 
is waived.  See Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 
741 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We shall not address the issues raised by 
the plaintiffs on their cross-appeal as the plaintiffs waived them 
by failing to argue them in their briefs.  Instead of providing 
argument with respect to their issues, the plaintiffs merely 
referred to their pre- and post-trial briefs.  We therefore decline 
to address those issues.” (citations omitted)). 
19 Although Gonzalez joins this argument, see Gonzalez 
Br. 3, the District Court did not apply this enhancement to her 
sentence. 
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[i]f, in a manner creating a substantial risk of 
serious bodily injury, the defendant or a person 
for whose conduct the defendant is otherwise 
accountable . . . knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe that a person was a law 
enforcement officer, assaulted such officer 
during the course of the offense or immediate 
flight therefrom. . . . 
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1).  The defendants’ argument relies on 
their sufficiency of the evidence challenge; that is, they argue 
that this enhancement should not apply because David did not 
know of his father’s plan to kill Belford, and thus, it was not 
reasonably foreseeable to him that law enforcement officers 
might have been harmed during the course of the conspiracy.  
The defendants argue that David’s mere presence in the 
courthouse is an insufficient basis on which to base this 
enhancement.  
  
 The District Court applied this enhancement because 
Thomas shot and wounded two police officers in the course of 
the shootout following his killing of Belford.  Additionally, the 
District Court found that conducting a shooting in a courthouse 
lobby, where officers were present, created a reasonably 
foreseeable chance of harm coming to those officers.  The jury 
found that David’s actions resulted in the death of Belford.  As 
a result, during sentencing, the District Court found that David 
was a knowing participant in his father’s plans on the day of 
the shooting and he had a “specific intent to kill Belford.”  App. 
6057.  The District Court concluded that in light of the fact that 
David was present in the courthouse lobby, had accompanied 
his father there, and was aware of the events that were about to 
transpire, it was “entirely foreseeable” that there would be a 
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potential threat to the numerous uniformed law enforcement 
officers present in the courthouse lobby.  App. 6050.   
 
We agree.  In light of the evidence presented at trial and 
before the District Court, the District Court’s application of the 
facts to this enhancement was not an abuse of discretion.  It was 
entirely reasonable for the District Court to find that it was 
foreseeable to David that a law enforcement officer might be 
harmed in the events that were about to transpire.  Accordingly, 
the District Court did not err in applying this enhancement.  
 
3. Vulnerable Victim Enhancement 
 
 The defendants next contend that the District Court 
abused its discretion in applying the Vulnerable Victim 
enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), because they claim that 
the Government failed to prove the existence of the requisite 
nexus between the vulnerable status of the victims and the 
ultimate success of the crime.  The District Court determined 
that there was such a nexus and applied the enhancement, 
finding that Belford’s children were victims of the defendants’ 
stalking campaign.  
 
 The Vulnerable Victim enhancement, in relevant part, 
applies “[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a 
victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.”  U.S.S.G. § 
3A1.1(b)(1).  The application note to this enhancement defines 
a “vulnerable victim” as a victim of the defendant’s offense of 
conviction, and any other conduct for which the defendant is 
responsible, that is “particularly susceptible” or “unusually 
vulnerable” to the criminal conduct due to, inter alia, their age, 
physical condition, or mental condition.  U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. 
n.2.  In addition, we require that “the defendant knew or should 
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have known of this susceptibility or vulnerability” and that it 
“facilitated the defendant’s crime in some manner.”  United 
States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 
United States v. Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(requiring “a nexus between the victim’s vulnerability and the 
crime’s ultimate success” (quoting United States v. Lee, 973 
F.2d 832, 834 (10th Cir. 1992))).   
 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
applying the Vulnerable Victim enhancement.  Belford had 
young children at the time she was killed, who also suffered 
through the defendants’ years-long stalking campaign.  As 
young children, they were “particularly susceptible or 
vulnerable to the criminal conduct.”  Iannone, 184 F.3d at 220; 
see also United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 233 (1st Cir. 
2011) (“Minors are often regarded as especially vulnerable 
victims.”).  The defendants certainly knew of the young ages 
of the children to whom they were related.  All of Belford’s 
children were victims of the stalking conduct targeted at their 
mother.  Indeed, some of them testified at trial that they were 
aware of the stalking campaign — which included false 
allegations that one of the children had been sexually molested 
by her mother — and that they were afraid both for their own 
safety and that of their mother.  App. 2654-58.  Due to their 
young age, all of these children were more likely to experience 
substantial emotional distress as a result of the defendants’ 
conduct; they were powerless to protect themselves from 
allegations of sexual abuse, and as children, were less able to 
defend and protect themselves against any attempted harm 
from the adult defendants.  These fears were reasonable in light 
of the fact that two of the defendants, David and Lenore, 
previously had kidnapped the children.  Accordingly, the 
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District Court did not err in applying of the Vulnerable Victim 
enhancement.20 
 
4. Eighth Amendment 
 
 Finally, Gonzalez brings an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to her sentence of life imprisonment.  We have held 
that “a sentence within the limits imposed by statute is neither 
excessive nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment.”  United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 186 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Gonzalez’s life sentence was authorized by 
statute and recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(1); U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1; App. 6048.  In 
sentencing Gonzales to life imprisonment, the District Court noted 
that she played an instrumental role in the conspiracy against 
Belford, whose death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of the conspiracy.  Thus, her life sentence does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
                                              
20 Additionally, even if both the Official Victim and 
Vulnerable Victim enhancements were applied in error, the 
error would be harmless as the relevant Guidelines range 
would be the same without either enhancement.  See United 
States v. Isaac, 655 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 2011) (“However, 
the error was completely harmless because even with the one 
point reduction, Isaac would remain in criminal history 
category IV and the same Guideline range would have 
applied.”). 
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 For the foregoing reasons, and recognizing the 
outstanding work of Judge McHugh, we will affirm in all 
respects. 
 
